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A bipartisan consensus against mandatory minimum sentenc-
ing appears to be emerging across this country. Even some law 
enforcement officers and corrections officials now admit publicly 
that our nation’s harsh sentencing practices have resulted in over-
incarceration and are ineffective at reducing recidivism.1 Many 
judges — including the Chief Justice of our state’s Supreme Judicial 
Court — favor repeal of these laws because they limit and some-
times eliminate judicial discretion.2 While numerous bills have been 
introduced in the Massachusetts Legislature to abolish some current 
mandatory penalties,3 for reasons discussed below these bills have 
mostly languished. This essay highlights one potential route out of 
the legislative logjam.
The rise in mandatory minimum penalties in the early 1980s4 
reflected, in part, a lack of trust in judges. When a high-profile 
case ends with a result that is widely criticized, or the danger to 
the public by certain threatened criminal behavior intensifies, the 
community tends to become less hospitable to judicial discretion 
in sentencing. Fear of “liberal judges” letting off violent criminals 
looms large in the public consciousness.5 Yet when crime rates are 
low and incarceration rates (and resulting financial costs) are high, 
the public appears to be more receptive to increased judicial discre-
tion in sentencing. The current national swing away from manda-
tory minimum sentencing toward guided judicial discretion is one 
end of an “arc” that tends to repeat itself over time.
Various sentencing schemes have flourished in our society 
throughout history — from open -ended discretion capped at a max-
imum sentence, to discretion bounded by sentencing guidelines, to 
mandatory sentencing. In Massachusetts, dozens of crimes carry 
mandatory minimum sentences (most notably murder,6 some sex of-
fenses,7 most drug trafficking crimes,8 certain robbery and firearms 
charges,9 and repeat offender DUI10). But for most crimes, the leg-
islature has set only a maximum sentence by statute, and the judge 
has discretion to sentence the convicted offender to probation or any 
term of years below that maximum amount.
Massachusetts established a state Sentencing Commission in 
1994 as part of the “truth in sentencing” law.11 The Sentencing 
Commission published sentencing guidelines for most crimes back 
in 1998, but these now dusty guidelines are advisory only; they do 
not have the force of law because they were never formally adopted 
by the legislature.
The General Court’s reluctance to approve sentencing guidelines 
has occurred during a time of significant changes in the constitu-
tional law of sentencing. In 2000, the United States Supreme Court 
in Apprendi v. New Jersey12 held that the Sixth Amendment to the 
Federal Constitution required any fact “[o]ther than the fact of a 
prior conviction” to be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a rea-
sonable doubt (or admitted by the defendant), when it increases the 
penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum.13 In 
2004, the Supreme Court specifically found that the State of Wash-
ington’s determinate sentencing scheme violated the Sixth Amend-
ment because it permitted a trial judge to increase a sentence based 
upon a fact found by the judge by a preponderance of the evidence.14 
Applying this principle one year later in United States v. Booker,15 
the Supreme Court invalidated the mandatory nature of the United 
States Sentencing Guidelines and made the guidelines advisory.16
In the decade since Booker, the Massachusetts General Court has 
not enacted advisory sentencing guidelines. Accordingly, judges in 
Massachusetts are not required to follow the 1998 state sentencing 
guidelines, and they do not have to state their reasons for imposing 
a sentence out of conformity with the guidelines.
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The Massachusetts Sentencing Commission’s task until recent-
ly has been to collect, analyze and update data about sentencing. 
Governor Deval Patrick reconstituted the 15-member Sentencing 
Commission in 2014. Many had hoped that this new and revitalized 
commission would update the guidelines, address more fully inter-
mediate sanctions and re entry practices, and help shape a consensus 
among judges, prosecutors and the defense bar that could lead to 
formal legislative adoption of Massachusetts’s long dormant guide-
lines system. To date, however, that has not happened. The new 
Sentencing Commission seems to have focused its attention primar-
ily on the mandatory minimum debate to the exclusion of other 
issues regarding judicial discretion.17 In order to break a legislative 
logjam around mandatory minimum sentencing, the commission is 
now considering recommending a “safety valve” to allow judges to 
deviate from certain mandatory sentences after making findings of 
special circumstances, similar to the Federal Drug Safety Valve.18
The debate over the repeal of mandatory minimum sentences (or 
“safety valve” relief therefrom) is important. But it appears to have 
stalled in the current legislative session, primarily because many 
influential district attorneys and law enforcement officers in Mas-
sachusetts are opposed to returning to the days when judges had 
unbridled sentencing discretion.19 They point to lower crime rates 
in Massachusetts20 as evidence that our current sentencing laws are 
working. Not wanting to appear soft on crime, the legislature ap-
pears to have little stomach for fixing something that is not obvious-
ly broken.21 Without the support of the district attorneys, pending 
crime bills are unlikely to gain legislative momentum.
We see at least one potential way out of the legislative impasse on 
repealing mandatory minimum sentences. If judges were required 
to publicly state the reasons for their sentences in all felony cases, 
this critical phase of the criminal justice system would become more 
transparent. Legislators, those involved in criminal cases, and the 
public would better understand some sentences which at first blush 
may appear too lenient or too harsh. In addition, appellate review of 
these sentences, while remaining highly deferential, would become 
more meaningful.
The legislature already requires judges to give reasons for certain 
felony sentences, but only for some crimes and only under very lim-
ited circumstances. Pursuant to Massachusetts General Laws chap-
ter 265, section 41,22 judges sitting in the Superior Court and the 
District Court jury of six session are required to state their reasons 
for imposing a sentence whenever a conviction for a felony under 
chapter 265 does not result in incarceration.23 The statute does not 
apply, however, to the many serious offenses penalized in other chap-
ters of the general laws, such as arson,24 armed entry into a dwell-
ing at night,25 witness intimidation,26 illegal sale of large -capacity 
weapons27 and violation of a domestic abuse restraining order,28 not 
to mention hundreds of so-called “white collar” felonies.29 Second, 
the statute only applies if the judge does not sentence the defendant 
to any incarceration. Even one day in the house of correction re-
lieves the judge of any obligation to state the reasons for his or her 
decision. Finally, the statute does not apply to district court judges 
sitting in jury- waived sessions, who impose sentences in thousands 
of criminal cases each year.
We believe that Massachusetts General Laws chapter 265, sec-
tion 41 should be expanded to apply to all felony cases regardless of 
whether jail time is imposed, and irrespective of whether they fall 
under the ambit of chapter 265. The requirement that judges state 
their reasons for imposing sentences in all felony cases should ap-
ply initially only in superior court, but ultimately, this requirement 
17. Brandon Gee, “Sentencing Panel Eyes ‘Safety Valve’ Proposal,” Mass. 
Lawyers Weekly, Oct. 26, 2015, at 1. 
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the defendant was not an organizer, leader, manager or supervisor of others in 
the offense, and was not engaged in a continuing criminal enterprise; and (5) 
the defendant must truthfully provide to the government all information and 
evidence the defendant has concerning the offense or offenses that were part of 
the same course of conduct or of a common scheme or plan, but the fact that 
the defendant has no relevant or useful other information to provide or that the 
government is already aware of the information shall not preclude his/her safety 
valve eligibility. Id. The Supreme Judicial Court has also taken direct appellate 
review of a case raising the issue of whether a judge has the power to sentence a 
narcotics offender below the mandatory minimum term required by statute. See 
Commonwealth v. Laltaprasad, Supreme Judicial Court No. SJC-11970.
19. Maria Cramer, “DA Slams Top Judge over Drug Sentences,” Boston 
Globe, March 17, 2015, at B1.
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between 1988 and 2012. EOPS, Violent Crime In Massachusetts: A 25 Year Retro-
spective (2014). For a comparison of the crime rate per 100,000 for major violent 
and property offenses in Massachusetts cities between 2001 and 2015, see www.
city data.com/crime/crime Boston Massachusetts.html.
21. Massachusetts has a lower incarceration rate per capita than many compa-
rable states. The Sentencing Project: Research and Advocacy for Reform, available 
at www.sentencingproject.org/map/map.cfm (last visited Jan. 16, 2016).
22. The statute provides: “In sentencing a person for a violation of any pro-
vision of this chapter, the penalty for which includes imprisonment, a judge 
sitting in superior court or in a jury of six session who does not impose such 
sentence of imprisonment shall include in the record of the case specific reasons 
for not imposing a sentence of imprisonment. Notwithstanding any general or 
special law to the contrary, the record of such reasons shall be a public record.” 
Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 265, §41.
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fenses range from murder (§1), to rape (§22), to kidnapping (§26), to simple 
assault and battery (§13A).
24. See Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 266, §1.
25. See Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 266, §14.
26. See Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 268, §13B.
27. See Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 269, §10F.
28. See Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 209A, §7.
29. See, e.g., Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 266, §30 (larceny), §35A (mortgage fraud); 
§53 (embezzlement by bank officer or employee); §56 (embezzlement by broker 
or agent); §58 (embezzlement from voluntary association); §67 (false entry in 
corporate records); §67B (false claims to commonwealth); §5 (uttering forged 
instrument); Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 268A, §2 (bribery of public official).
82 / Massachusetts Law Review Sentencing Reform: The Power of Reasons / 83
should apply to all felony cases in all courts.30 Given the much 
higher volume of district court felony cases, and the fact that the 
most serious crimes are prosecuted in superior court, limiting the re-
quirement initially to superior court seems sensible. The legislature 
recently has taken this approach with regard to attorney -conducted 
voir dire.31
Sentencing is one of the most profound powers bestowed upon a 
public official. The primary reasons why judges should explain how 
they exercise this awesome power — promoting transparency in 
government and preventing the arbitrary or discriminatory exercise 
of governmental authority — seem compelling to us. Defendants 
who will be spending years of their lives behind prison walls, victims 
who fear the day when the perpetrators will be back on the street 
and citizens concerned about public safety all deserve an explana-
tion for the particular sentence that a judge will impose.
Sentencing is a very difficult and emotion -laden task. It requires 
balancing multiple considerations and sometimes contradictory in-
terests. The Massachusetts Sentencing Commission’s Report to the 
General Court in 199632 recognized four primary purposes to be 
achieved in criminal sentencing: retribution (“just desserts”), deter-
rence, incapacitation and rehabilitation.33 The enabling statute of 
the Federal Sentencing Commission recognizes the same penologi-
cal objectives.34 While one or more of these goals has gained schol-
arly prominence at different points in our nation’s history, many 
observers believe that each has a valid role to play in fashioning 
an appropriate sentence. What “mix” of considerations will be ap-
propriate in a given case may vary with the circumstances of the 
offense, the criminal history of the defendant, and the interests of 
the victims and the public.
It is anomalous that judges sitting in Massachusetts criminal 
cases do not already have to give reasons for the sentences that they 
impose. Massachusetts judges are required to give reasons on the 
record for many of their most significant decisions, including hold-
ing a defendant without bail based on dangerousness grounds,35 
expanding the time before trial under the Speedy Trial Act in the 
interest of justice36 and revoking probation.37 It is thus surprising 
that judges can exercise their most sweeping authority — the power 
to deprive a convicted defendant of his or her liberty for an extended 
period of time — without any explanation for their decisions.
For those judges who routinely state on the record their reasons 
for imposing a sentence, our proposed amendment to chapter 265, 
section 41 would result in little or no change. For the many other 
judges who sometimes give reasons for their sentences, an expanded 
statute would require that they more routinely perform a task that 
already intuitively makes sense to them. Of course, for those judges 
who rarely if ever explain the reasons for their sentences, an expand-
ed statute would be an unwelcome sea change.
Judges who refrain from publicly announcing the reasons for 
their sentences offer two principal explanations for that practice. 
First, sentencing is a complex and nuanced task. For experienced 
judges, sentencing involves a complex set of factors honed over many 
years that includes comparison to a large number of similar previous 
cases. Asking these judges to give reasons for their sentences is like 
asking an experienced artist to explain the placement of each brush 
stroke on a canvas. But even the most skillfully and carefully crafted 
sentence fails to satisfy the important public goals of transparency 
and ensuring non -arbitrary decision- making if no reasons are given 
for the sentence. Moreover, the very process of forcing oneself to 
articulate the most important reasons for a decision helps ensure 
that the decision is being made for valid reasons that can withstand 
public scrutiny. Highly regarded judges tell us that the process of 
writing down their reasons for imposing a sentence has on occasion 
caused them to revise their thinking and fashion a better sentence.
The other reason frequently offered by judges for not publicly 
announcing the reasons for their sentences is that the net effect of 
this process will be wasted judicial resources on meritless appeals 
in which the failure to mention one valid reason for sentencing, or 
taking out of context one phrase uttered by the judge, will invalidate 
the sentence. These judges envision spending countless hours care-
fully choosing each word, time that could better be spent on the 
scores of other important matters that judges handle each day. We 
have two responses to this objection.
First, we are not advocating that the Appellate Division change 
its highly deferential approach toward reviewing superior court 
sentences.38 Second, in decades of superior court judges giving rea-
sons for their sentences in thousands of cases, only a handful of 
30. Federally, District Court judges are mandated by statute to state in open 
court their reasons for imposing a particular sentence. See 18 U.S.C. §3553(c) 
(“[t]he court, at the time of sentencing, shall state in open court the reasons 
for its imposition of the particular sentence.…). Federal trial judges also must 
reduce their statement of sentencing reasons to writing and attach it to the judg-
ment and conviction. 18 U.S.C. §3553(c)(2).
31. See Massachusetts Session Laws, chapter 254 of the Acts of 2014.
32. Massachusetts Sentencing Commission, Report to the General Court, avail-
able at www.mass.gov/courts/docs/admin/sentcomm/sentencing-comm-report-
to-the-general-court-96.pdf.
33. Id. at 4.
34. 18 U.S.C. §3533(a).
35. Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 276, §58A.
36. Mass. R. Crim. P. Rule 36(b)(2)(f).
37. See Commonwealth v. Fay, 379 Mass. 498, 504 (1980).
38. Upon petition of the defendant, Superior Court sentences are subject to re-
view by the Superior Court’s Appellate Division, which consists of three judges 
appointed by the chief justice of the Superior Court. Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 278, 
§§28A- 28C. However, this statute does not require that either the sentencing 
judges or the Appellate Division give reasons for their decisions, and the statute 
contains no standard of appellate review. In fiscal year 2015, 295 defendants ap-
pealed 676 sentences to the Appellate Division, resulting in 11 sentences being 
reduced and four sentences being increased. Trial Court Statistics, FY 15.
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comments have led to reversals, and these comments usually reflect-
ed reasons for imposing a sentence that should not have been part 
of the sentencing process.39 In those few instances where the line 
between proper and improper comment seems nebulous, judges will 
simply have to avoid disfavored phrases.40
In most public opinion polls, the judiciary scores higher in pub-
lic trust than the other two branches of government.41 Yet public 
distrust over judicial discretion in sentencing persists. We are confi-
dent that this state’s conscientious judges take sentencing seriously, 
and that there are compelling, valid reasons for most sentences they 
impose. Forcing those reasons “out into the open” will increase 
not only transparency and public understanding of the sentencing 
process, but also public trust. Over time, as public understand-
ing increases, the legislature’s resistance to repealing mandatory 
minimums may erode. Even if expanding chapter 265, section 41 to 
cover all felony cases fails to achieve this lofty goal, it will have been 
the right thing to do.
R. Michael Cassidy is professor of law and faculty director at the 
Rappaport Center for Law and Public Policy at Boston College 
Law School.
Hon. Robert L. Ullmann is an associate justice for the 
Massachusetts Superior Courts. 
The authors are very grateful for the capable research and editorial 
assistance of Kathryn Ball, Boston College Law School Class of 
2017.
39. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Coleman, 390 Mass. 797, 806 (1984) (trial 
judge “may not consider a defendant’s alleged perjury on the witness stand in 
determining the punishment...”); Commonwealth v. White, 48 Mass. App. 
Ct. 658, 663 (2000) (remanding case for re sentencing where judge increased 
sentence because he believed past sentences were inadequate); Commonwealth 
v. Howard, 42 Mass. App. Ct. 322, 327 (1997) (remanding for re-sentencing 
where judge gave as one reason for sentence that “Athol area seems to have more 
than its share of child abuse cases and a large number of young shiftless men 
who have little or no regard for the personal or property rights of others”).
40. We do not fully understand why it is improper to impose a sentence in part 
to “send a message” to a particular community, see Commonwealth v. Mills, 
436 Mass. 387, 402 (2002), when deterring criminal conduct by others is a valid 
goal of sentencing, see Commonwealth v. Donahue 452 Mass. 256, 264 (2008). 
However, it seems easy enough to avoid that disfavored phrase.
41. See Gallup Polls, “Trust in Government” survey, available at www.gal-
lup.com/poll/5392/trust gov.aspx.
